# On Wittgenstein Although I don't agree on many things with early Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a masterpiece. I wrote a post about it before. Check the "Tractatus Is Heavily Misunderstood" post. I think it's his most important work. In addition to the post, Tractatus is a koan itself. What is a koan? There are two schools contrasting each other in Zen Buddhism. Soto school and Rinzai school. Soto school emphasises Shikantaza. Rinzai school emphasises Koan. Shikantaza means silent meditation. You sit without thinking anything. Instead you strictly focus on your senses. By feeling those senses, you would realise that there is no boundary between I and not-I. There is no absolute "I". No Atman. And the emptiness is the ultimate reality. This is what commonly considered "Zen meditation" is. This is what John Cage did in 4'33''. In contrast, in Rinzai school they meditate by eagerly thinking of a riddle that has no answer. Like this: > Two hands clap and there is a sound. What is the sound of one > hand? > > Hakuin Ekaku This is called a Koan. It is to exhaust the analytic mind. So that you can achieve the emptiness. The mystical empty mind comes in where the analytic mind left. You would feel that logic is meaningless. This is what Tractatus does. To requote the sentences in Tractatus, after tons of logical analysis, > 6.52. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be > answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at > all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is > the answer. > 6.522. There is indeed the inexpressible. This SHOWS itself; it > is the mystical. > 6.54. [...] > > (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed > up it.) > > He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the > world aright. > 7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Philosophical investigations is a negative commentary on Tractatus. You should read it with Tractatus. It complements Tractatus. Maybe it completes Tractatus. If you interpret the use of ordinary language as a SHOWING. Though I interpret SHOWING as art from the context of Schopenhauer. In contrast to the common belief, late Wittgenstein is the continuation of early Wittgenstein. They are not radically different. He just discarded the picture theory of language. I think this misconception comes from regarding the picture theory as the essence of the book. However I think Peirce is far better than late Wittgenstein in many aspects. The meaning is its use. Both are quite Aristotelian. > Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical > bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, > our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception > of the object. > > Charles Sanders Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" But late Wittgenstein is too linguistic and social. Though he is important because of that. In contrast Peirce is closer to logical positivists than late Wittgenstein in terms of language. He emphisised symbolic logic. Also I think the autistic misinterpretation of Kripkenstein is better than the original. It deformed the original text and made it better. Though it might be just reintroducing David Hume.